ASTANA — As major powers retreat from global leadership roles, middle powers must step up to advance subregional integration, said Professor Yan Xuetong, a renowned Chinese political scientist and one of the world’s most influential thinkers in the field of international relations, during a lecture in Astana on April 28.
Professor Yan Xuetong. Photo credit: Qalam project.
Yan, a distinguished professor and honorary dean at the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, is widely recognized as the founder of moral realism, a theory that places leadership values and strategic preferences at the center of international politics. He is the author of several seminal works on global leadership and foreign policy and serves as editor-in-chief of The Chinese Journal of International Politics. In 2008, Foreign Policy magazine named him among the world’s top 100 global thinkers.
Organized by the Kazakhstan Council on International Relations and the Qalam multimedia project, the event was part of a lecture series that previously featured scholars such as Barry Buzan and Parag Khanna.
Yan highlighted that with global shifts, so-called Middle Powers, such as Kazakhstan, will have more space to contribute to regional integration. “When there is no leader, regional powers must step up to create regional markets and frameworks for cooperation,” he said.
He pointed to China-Kazakhstan relations as the most comprehensive among China’s ties in Central Asia.
“China’s cooperation with other Central Asian states is mostly limited to border and economic issues. But the cooperation with Kazakhstan is broader. If China wants to deepen regional integration in Central Asia, it will have to rely on Kazakhstan,” said Yan.
Constructivism, liberalism and realism: theoretical gaps
Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS) Yerkin Tukumov and Professor Yan Xuetong. Photo credit: Nagima Abuova / The Astana Times
Yan’s lecture focused on his theory of moral realism, a framework that places leadership values and decision-making at the core of foreign policy. To illustrate this, he addressed the limitations of mainstream international relations (IR) theories, such as constructivism, liberalism, and classical realism, in explaining recent global developments.
He first highlighted constructivism, a theory that emphasizes the power of norms and ideas in shaping state behavior. After the Cold War, many constructivists expected a steady evolution from hostility to cooperation, ultimately leading to global harmony. They assumed history followed a forward-moving trajectory.
“They think the world moves universally forward. They do not expect a U-turn,” said Yan, noting that recent developments, such as growing nationalism and the retreat from globalization, have contradicted this view.
“Constructivism cannot explain why the norm of globalization can no longer maintain the trend of history,” he said.
Turning to liberalism, often referred to as institutionalism, Yan explained that this theory centers on the role of domestic and international institutions as checks on political power. Liberals argue that democratic institutions should constrain harmful policymaking and that international institutions reduce costs and encourage cooperation.
Lastly, Yan addressed realism, which asserts that state behavior is driven by material power and national interest. However, he pointed out that U.S. power and interests remained relatively constant between the Trump and Biden administrations.
“If power and interest did not change, why did U.S policymakers change their policies? Is American foreign policy driven by power and interest or by something else?” posited Yan.
Leadership and the logic of moral realism
To explain these gaps, Yan introduced a moral realism theory that puts national leaders and their values at the center of foreign policy.
“My theory argues that the change is due to a different type of leadership. That means leaders, policymakers, they have the power to establish institutions, to abandon the institution, to undermine the institution or to reshape the institution,” said Yan.
“So whatever the institution does depends on the leadership. If the leadership allows the institution to work, it works,” he added.
Yan emphasized that even when nations pursue similar strategic goals, such as economic growth or national strength, the approaches taken by leaders can vary depending on the leaders’ moral frameworks. He called this phenomenon “strategic preference.”
“Suppose we all need money. Everyone wants to become rich, but I am 100% sure that none of us will take exactly the same approach to making money. People like me, we make money by teaching courses, and policymakers, others make money by making decisions,” said Yan.
The goal is the same, but the method reflects personal values. According to Yan, this logic also applies to foreign policy.
When personal priorities override national interests
According to Yan, at the core of moral realism is the belief that foreign policy is shaped not only by structures of power but by the moral character of leaders and their prioritization of personal versus national interests. He drew a contrast between moral leaders, who align personal goals with national interests, and immoral ones, who prioritize regime survival or personal gain.
He added that most traditional international relations theories assume that leaders will always act in the best interest of their nation. However, according to Yan, that is just an assumption. He pointed to regimes that isolate themselves despite clear economic benefits from global engagement.
“Policymakers know that if they join the international community, the country will benefit a lot,” he said, explaining why they refuse. “That means there is a conflict between regime security and national security. National security means the security of the people and regime security means the security for policymakers. So even today, you still can see this kind of situation.”
The era of counter-globalization
Yan highlighted that counter-globalization has been driven by political leadership rather than structural or institutional forces.
“The world changed because leaders in major powers adopted de-globalization policies,” he said.
He described globalization as the emergence of a unified global market following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Before that, markets were divided, with Eastern Europe lacking market economies, China being closed, India largely self-contained, and the U.S. mainly engaged in bilateral rather than multilateral trade.
According to Yan, global integration accelerated with the creation of shared regulations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), though resistance persisted. Small businesses and local vendors struggled to compete with international corporations.
“For a very long time during the Cold War, the main type of leadership was liberal leadership. It supported globalization,” said Yan, highlighting that governments opened their markets, invited foreign investment, and backed international cooperation.
But by the 2010s, some governments began withdrawing support. Yan cited the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union and the U.S.-China trade stand-off under the first Trump administration as key turning points. He defined de-globalization as “governments using their power to reduce international cooperation.”
