The post-Cold War liberal international order under U.S. leadership – often called Pax Americana – has unraveled. Notably, this collapse has not come from a new superpower displacing the United States, but largely from American retreat and self-inflicted contradictions.

Miras Zhiyenbayev. Photo credit: Maqsut Narikbayev University
The net effect has been a U.S. pullback from moral and strategic leadership, leaving a vacuum in global governance. Crucially, no single power – not even a rising China – has stepped in to fully replace the U.S. as hegemon. Instead, the world faces a more diffuse and uncertain landscape, essentially a leaderless order, born from the contradictions and retreat of the erstwhile guarantor rather than conquest by a new one.
The ideological foundations of the post-Cold War Western-led order have also come into question. Triumphalist theories of the 1990s, like Francis Fukuyama’s end of history thesis (which proclaimed liberal democracy as the final stage of societal evolution) or the late Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power” (which presumed the universal appeal of Western values), in hindsight appear reductionist and overly universalizing. They failed to anticipate the varied historical trajectories and value systems of different societies.
Critics note that Fukuyama’s thesis ignored the enduring power of nationalism, religion and cultural identity as counter-forces to liberal democracy. In practice, the Western project of spreading liberal democracy often assumed a one-size-fits-all path to modernity. Attempts to impose a single model of governance and values on all nations have frequently led to backlash and poor outcomes, rather than the peaceful convergence predicted. And while liberal values have intrinsic merits, foisting them rapidly and uniformly on diverse societies “often leads to poor outcomes”, weakening the appeal of those values and provoking resentment. The failures of U.S.-led state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan epitomize this naïveté.
Moreover, the “dissonance between rhetoric and reality” – with Western powers promoting democracy and human rights while sometimes acting inconsistently with those principles — has raised questions about the credibility of liberal universalism. In many parts of the world, this has led to perceptions that such principles are applied selectively or strategically, which can diminish their persuasive power. As a result, the post-Cold War expectation that all nations would naturally converge toward a Western model of governance has lost some of its resonance. A more nuanced perspective has emerged: that multiple paths to modernity exist, and that universal frameworks must be attentive to local contexts and historical experiences. This shift has created space for alternative models to be recognized on their own terms, rather than viewed solely in comparison to Western norms.
Middle Powers in an upside-down world
With the old top-down hierarchy in flux, middle powers are increasingly pivotal in shaping the emerging order. These states are often “swing” players in global affairs: not fully aligned with either Washington or Beijing, and thus free to forge new coalitions and norms. For example, in 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky toured capitals from Jeddah to Jakarta to court leaders of Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia – major fence-sitters whose stances on the Russia–Ukraine war could sway diplomatic outcomes. Such outreach underscored that these Global South middle powers “have more power today than ever before,” owing to their increased autonomy and the leverage gained from the U.S.–China rivalry.
Unlike Cold War-era “medium” states that mostly toed one bloc’s line, today’s middle powers are assertively pursuing independent foreign policies. They are leveraging multi-directional partnerships – economic, diplomatic, and security – to advance their own interests and regional stability. Analysts observe that middle powers now enjoy more agency than at any time since World War II, and can use it to shape a multipolar order, rather than passively following a superpower’s lead.
Crucially, these states also bring a moderating influence: by refusing to slot neatly into a U.S.-vs-China binary, they “prevent the US and China from imposing their interests on others,” acting as a counterweight to great-power dominance. In an upside-down world where old certitudes have weakened, middle powers serve as both balancers and bridge-builders. They often have the flexibility to mediate conflicts, propose creative solutions, and focus on pragmatic cooperation where great powers cannot. Their role, long undervalued, is now increasingly recognized as critical to global stability and governance in the emerging era.
Beyond universalism: a new order rooted in diversity and pragmatism
The likely emerging global order is often described as a return to realpolitik and great-power competition – a world where military and economic power, rather than liberal ideals, set the terms. Certainly, recent trends indicate a tilt toward interest-based, transactional politics over ideology. Major powers like the U.S., China, and Russia are all pursuing their interests with fewer constraints: arms races are accelerating, and rival blocs are solidifying in some areas. However, treating this as a simple regression to 19th-century power politics misses a crucial dynamic: middle powers can moderate and humanize this order by infusing it with their own values and cooperative instincts. Rather than abstract “universal” ideals emanating from one civilization, the new order could be grounded in a plurality of value systems and regional norms – a more organic internationalism that reflects the world’s cultural and historical diversity.
Middle powers like Kazakhstan play a vital role here by anchoring diplomacy in principles that resonate locally (such as sovereignty, mutual respect and gradual reform) and by championing inclusive dialogue. In Central Asia, for example, there is a longstanding emphasis on stability, sovereignty, and economic development over ideological alignment. This doesn’t mean values like human rights or democracy are irrelevant; rather, it means progress in those areas must be gradual and home-grown to be legitimate.
The failure of value-based crusades has shown that trying to force one blueprint globally often backfires, “weakening the appeal” of those very values and creating resistance. A more sustainable approach is for states to pursue shared interests – peace, development, climate action – through the prism of their own cultures and histories.
For instance, Asian and African middle powers might stress principles of consensus and non-interference (as ASEAN does) or Latin American middle powers might emphasize social justice and sovereignty (echoing doctrines like non-intervention). These aren’t “empty relativisms” but genuine contributions to a balanced world order. The unipolar moment bred a sense of Western superiority that assumed one path for global progress; reality has proven far more nuanced, with the world being “a spectrum of diverse shades of grey” rather than black-and-white. In a complex multipolar world, no single ideology can claim absolute authority.
Middle powers can harness this moment to push for pragmatic cooperation anchored in mutual benefit and cultural understanding, rather than divisive ideological crusades. We already see them taking initiatives: formats like the BRICS and G20 have enabled non-Western powers to set agendas on development and trade in line with their experiences. Coalitions led by middle powers have tackled issues like climate adaptation funding, mediating regional conflicts, and reforming international financial institutions.
Crucially, these efforts tend to be inclusive and interest-driven – focusing on concrete gains (infrastructure, health, security) that all parties can support. This trend can counterbalance the harsher edges of great-power rivalry. While Washington and Beijing jostle for supremacy, a coalition of influential middle states can insist on rules and norms that protect smaller countries’ interests and global public goods. Dani Rodrik argues that in a multipolar world, such countries are well-positioned to “lead on many pressing issues” and to offer a vision that doesn’t depend on either superpower’s dominance.
In other words, they can supply much-needed leadership in areas where the U.S. and China are at odds or disengaged – be it coordinating pandemic responses, brokering regional ceasefires, or steering global economic recovery. By exercising this leadership, middle powers help prevent an outright free-for-all of power politics. They show that pragmatism need not equal cynicism – it can be enlightened and principled on its own terms. Kazakhstan’s proposal of a “holistic, indivisible Eurasian security” architecture is a case in point: President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev suggested using Eurasia’s traditions of coexistence as a basis for a “multipolar, fair and sustainable world order,” calling for détente and renewed dialogue amid the global turbulence. Such ideas root international cooperation in regional experiences and needs, rather than in abstract universals or distant hegemonic designs.
The liberal world order as we know it is indeed over, brought down not by one challenger’s victory but by its internal contradictions and loss of credibility. What comes next will not be a simple binary order under a new hegemon, but a more pluralistic and fluid system. Middle powers, often overlooked in grand narratives, are stepping up to shape this system – keeping major powers in check, filling gaps in governance, and championing a more inclusive ethos. Kazakhstan’s multivector balancing act and diplomatic activism typify how such states can punch above their weight to promote stability. They insist that there are many valid paths to modernity and that global norms must accommodate different historical trajectories. The new era will likely see a mix of power politics and pragmatic cooperation, but it need not be “nasty, brutish and short.”
If middle powers continue to coalesce around shared interests and ground their diplomacy in authenticity – in values tested by their own history – they can help build a fairer, multipolar order. This order may lack the sweeping idealism of the post-1990s Western vision, but it could prove more resilient and representative. In an upside-down world, the middle powers may well become the anchors of a new equilibrium, guiding international relations away from zero-sum confrontation and toward a more balanced, culturally legitimate, and truly global order.
Miras Zhiyenbayev is Advisor to the Chairman of the Board for International Affairs and Initiatives at Maqsut Narikbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan. He has authored the book “Widening the Scope: How Middle Powers are Changing Liberal Institutionalism” at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS, 2023).
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Astana Times.