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Several water crises are unfolding in the country at once, and the Nura–Sarysu river basin is among the most acute. The assessment of water stress is up to almost 88%, close to the limit. The Nura-Sarysu basin is more than a hydrological unit on a map. It is the industrial and agricultural center of Kazakhstan, and any water crisis in the country can escalate into national security issues.
Aizhan Arshabeyeva.
While the problem is not new, for decades, the basin has lived for decades with the toxic legacy of mercury waste discharged by industry in Temirtau. Current mercury reviews confirm that the case of Nura and adjacent reservoirs remains among the most severe globally. Monitoring in 2017 showed that maximum permissible concentrations for mercury were exceeded in most samples (up to 4,800 ng/l). Layered on top of this are ongoing discharges from coal mines, metallurgical plants, tailings sites and municipal sewage treatment plants. Oversight exists, but it remains too weak to address the scale of the problem.
What makes the Nura-Sarysu unique in Kazakhstan? Due to the shortage of its own resources, the region depends on transfers. Discussions on water from the Irtysh basin, which feeds the Kanysh Satpayev Canal, intensified in 2025, driven by demand growth in all three neighboring countries. But that canal itself is overstretched. China, Russia and Kazakhstan all draw heavily from the Irtysh, and industrial demand is rising across the region.
In 2025, the expansion of flood and drought forecasting systems and support for implementing the new Water Code were announced. For Nura–Sarysu, the priority is to manage drainage fluctuations and water quality more precisely. This year will see a jump in investment and modernization (98 projects), including priorities such as improving drinking water supply and reconstructing key facilities, both highly relevant for the Nura–Sarysu basins and canal network.
The government and its partners are not ignoring the issue. The third UNECE Environmental Review (EPR-2025) updates the picture of water management and environmental policy of Kazakhstan, which is useful for substantiating institutional reforms at the basin level.
The UNDP has promoted stronger flood and drought forecasting and supported the implementation of a new Water Code, as well as initiatives by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and wastewater treatment projects. The Karagandy SPIT is being modernized to improve the quality of discharges; in parallel, civil society activists criticize design flaws (rain system/flood control measures). Kazakhstan itself has committed to significant investment: several policy documents record the expansion of drip and sprinkler irrigation, the digitalization of water distribution, and energy-saving upgrades at pumping stations, critical for the Satpayev Canal. This autumn, the canal has once again become a pressure point.
So, what escalated this autumn (September-October 2025) in Nura-Sarysu? The work window on the Satpayev Canal and preparations for winter loads, including reconstruction and ensuring power supply to pumping stations, is a sensitive period for maintaining stable deliveries to the Karagandy hub and Nura recharge zone. Any delays in repairs are now directly hitting the deficit. Any malfunction on the Satpayev canal directly threatens water deliveries to Karagandy and downstream users who depend on these transfers. As we head into the colder months, Kazhydromet has already flagged adverse conditions in Karagandy and Temirtau, exactly when low flows and operational stress can amplify risks from industrial and municipal discharges.
The high baseline stress of water in the Nura-Sarysu river basin is confirmed by the new consolidated data of 2025, which indicates that in autumn, the “short blanket” syndrome between urban and agricultural consumption becomes especially noticeable. But the fact remains: trust is low, and results are slow. The public is concerned about the lack of transparency in how water resources in this area are allocated, monitored and accounted for. Too often, people only hear about water issues once shortages have already emerged.
So what can be done here and now, and what is the suggested operational checklist for autumn? Daily transparent summaries on the Satpayev Canal, including flow rates, losses, and the energy consumption of pumping stations, should be introduced, supported by a public dashboard for Karagandy and Temirtau. “Hydro Bulletins plus quality” should link local discharge controls to Kazhydromet’s daily bulletins. A basic anti-crisis package is also needed: temporary online telemetry for major industrial users and spot checks of hotspots on the Nura after heavy rains.
Communication with the public should be streamlined through a single notification window for all water-related updates – repair schedules, conservation measures, and quality information, which would help reduce social tension during the mid-autumn repair peak. The decisions made today, whether on monitoring, infrastructure, or governance transparency, will have a direct impact in the near future. It is therefore essential not to overlook the critical variables in building a sustainable future.
The author is Aizhan Arshabeyeva, a graduate student at the Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Public Policy.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Astana Times.
