Trump locks Europe out of AI models; China presents the counter-proposal — a global AI platform, and everyone’s invited. What Beijing wants and why Europe remains skeptical.
By founding the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), China has created its own international framework for governing artificial intelligence — without the players that have traditionally shaped technology policy. For now.
Alexander Dergay.
The founding treaty was signed on July 16, in Shanghai by representatives from 29 countries, with UN Secretary-General António Guterres in attendance. The organization is headquartered in Shanghai. Founding members include Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South Africa, Serbia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, and Zambia, among others. The United States, E.U. member states, and India are not participating.
In Chinese diplomatic circles, WAICO is described as a “major step” through which the People’s Republic is answering the Global South’s call for greater participation in AI development. The organization is meant to serve two purposes: spreading AI applications across the Global South and organizing training and seminar programs. The goal, Beijing says, is to use AI “for good.”
Four principles — and a jab at Washington
The conceptual framework rests on four principles that China’s leadership laid out at the first World AI Conference in Shanghai: openness and win-win cooperation, risk awareness, inclusivity, and solidarity in global governance.
Under win-win, Beijing groups scenario-based applications such as AI plus industry and AI plus health — in other words, integrating AI with existing economic sectors. AI must remain safe, reliable, and controllable, the argument goes. China says it is working on technical oversight, early-warning and emergency-response mechanisms, as well as laws, standards, and ethical guidelines. Misuse is to be prevented and AI kept under human control.
China rejects what it calls the overextension of national security — the principle of placing one country’s security above the interests of others. The target is clearly export controls and access restrictions.
Asked whether this language should be read as a response to the short-notice blocking of leading American models for European users, Beijing pointed out that Chinese models are open-source, rendering any accusation of bloc-building moot.
The fourth principle aims at multilateralism. Governance rules and technical standards should be coordinated internationally, and Global South countries should receive support in building their own capacities — to avoid, in China’s phrasing, new historical injustices.
What China is concretely offering
Over the next five years, China intends to provide 5,000 AI training slots for participants from Global South countries. Whether these are degree programs, scholarships, or short-term courses remains unclear. Plans also include AI cooperation centers with organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A flagship project is an AI-powered early-warning system that, according to Chinese sources, forecasts typhoons and other extreme weather events in more than 30 countries.
How China translates technological cooperation into concrete projects — across blocs and without exclusive commitments — is currently on display in Kazakhstan. In June, the Central Asian country agreed with the American firm Firebird on investments of up to ten billion dollars in a computing cluster with up to 100,000 Nvidia GPUs in the coal-mining city of Ekibastuz. A month later, on the sidelines of the AI summit in Shanghai, more than 70 contracts with Chinese partners worth a combined total of over $15 billion were signed. The cross-sector package includes, among other things, a partnership with Huawei, the acquisition of Huawei technology, and further expansion of the data-center site in cooperation with the Hengtong Group.
Open to all — including Europe?
From Beijing’s perspective, an upgrade to an official UN body is not ruled out; the organization is still in its early stages, they say. Nor is EU membership excluded. The organization is in principle open to all and is not aimed exclusively at the Global South.
Beijing dismisses the accusation that the aim is to carve out new spheres of influence. It is not building blocs, the argument goes; the basis of cooperation is consultation and mutual benefit.
Still, the connection to the Digital Silk Road is hard to miss. When it comes to overlaps with the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative — in areas like digital services, health, and education — the answers remain vague. WAICO programs are described more as a complement to existing relationships.
The European Reading
Sources in Brussels security circles say WAICO is read less as a development initiative than as a strategic instrument. What matters is not the announced training slots or cooperation centers but the question of who will shape infrastructure, technical standards, and digital ecosystems in the years ahead. Countries that adopt Chinese models, networks, and processes early on could find themselves increasingly tied to providers and decision-making centers in Beijing or Shanghai over the long term.
Kazakhstan, however, shows that such cooperation does not necessarily lead to exclusive dependency. Astana is working simultaneously with American and Chinese partners, deploying Nvidia processors while also integrating Huawei and other Chinese providers into the expansion of its digital infrastructure. The government is deliberately keeping multiple technological pathways open rather than fully aligning with either of the two major blocs.
That is precisely what makes the example strategically significant: for many Global South countries, the issue is less about making a geopolitical statement than about accessing capital, computing power, and rapid implementation. The contract goes to whoever most convincingly bundles financing, technology, and infrastructure. For Europe, this is nonetheless a warning: future dependencies will not be determined solely by where systems originate, but above all by who delivers them first and operates them over the long haul.
The EU has been working since 2025 on implementing its concept for AI gigafactories — facilities each housing more than 100,000 advanced AI processors. For now, however, the focus in government offices is mainly on sites, financing, and procurement.
What stands out is the speed at which contracts are being signed and capacities built up elsewhere. Kazakhstan is simultaneously engaging American and Chinese technology companies, while Europe is still translating its own sovereign model into practice. The question is whether the planned pace will be fast enough to keep up with international developments.
In Brussels, digital sovereignty is thus moving to center stage. Europe wants to build its own computing capacity while avoiding long-term dependence on individual foreign providers for critical infrastructure.
Arindrajit Basu of the Carnegie Endowment describes WAICO as a state-centric model that primarily serves Chinese interests. Other Western analyses characterize WAICO as a counterpart to the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative. Participants or countries that have expressed interest in the American format include EU member states, Japan, Australia, and India.
Beijing courts Washington
Notably, Beijing is said to be open to cooperation with the United States. The two countries should extend their hands to each other, diplomatic circles say. AI is a global field, and its development must ultimately work for everyone.
When confronted with the objection that the U.S. administration does not currently appear inclined to cooperate, the response is puzzlement at Washington’s course — along with a reference to jointly supported UN resolutions. In Chinese publications, the line is stated more plainly: it is in the greatest shared interest of both nations that AI serve all of humanity. Following government consultations, a bilateral AI dialogue has also been agreed upon.
Beijing’s multilateral foundation is a UN General Assembly resolution on international AI capacity-building, adopted unanimously on July 1, 2024, which China had introduced. It calls for human-centered, inclusive, and sustainable AI development and special support for developing countries.
Building on that, China points to its own programs: the Global AI Governance Initiative of 2023, a 13-point action plan for global AI governance from 2025, and an AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All.
The five-year plan as engine
Domestically, the push coincides with the launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026–2030. According to Chinese sources, an intelligent economic system is to be built; the core AI industry, diplomatic circles say, has already reached a volume of more than 1.2 trillion yuan.
AI is no longer anything special in China, the narrative goes — it is already widespread, from smart manufacturing to consumer devices. At the same time, laws, regulations, application guidelines, and ethical principles are being continuously developed to keep AI safe and controllable.
China also sees itself as a provider of international public goods, including through the release of open-source models.
Export controls, energy, exchange rates
One sore point in Europe that stands in the way of closer cooperation is China’s export controls on critical minerals needed for semiconductors, batteries, and other key technologies. Beijing rejects the claim that these have caused lasting supply problems, pointing to expedited approval procedures and general licenses for companies. The additional controls, however, are suspended only until No. 10. Whether the relaxations will be extended or stricter licensing requirements will resume afterward remains an open question.
Beijing also pushes back against the recent accusation by Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz that China is keeping the renminbi artificially low. Against the euro, the Chinese currency has in fact risen from around 8.27 to roughly 7.71 yuan per euro since late October — an appreciation of a good seven percent.
The latest currency report from the U.S. Treasury Department, dated July 23, also does not classify China as a currency manipulator. Due to a lack of transparency in its exchange-rate policy, however, the country remains on the U.S. monitoring list. Europe’s criticism of China’s trade surpluses, subsidies, and state-led industrial policy is far from settled.
Despite Merz’s sweeping announcements about resuming German-Chinese government consultations, no date has been set so far. The chancellor had indicated a meeting would take place this year, or early 2027 at the latest. There is, as they say, plenty to discuss.
The author is Alexander Dergay, the founder and managing partner of Orbis Nova, a research and analysis firm. Dergay is also cooperating with geopolitical foresight agency Nightingale Int. He worked for several years as an adviser and analyst specializing in geostrategic risk before serving as an foreign policy editor at the Berliner Zeitung and the Ostdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Astana Times.
