Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s official visit to Germany in September took place in Berlin and Munich and, judging by its formal results, became one of the most productive in the history of bilateral relations. The parties signed more than 30 commercial documents worth approximately $2 billion and adopted a roadmap for industrial, technological and raw materials cooperation for 2026-2028. However, the main news from the visit was what was said about the war in Ukraine.
Eldaniz Gusseinov.
When it comes to settling the war in Ukraine, Europe and Russia speak different languages. Berlin proceeds from the premise that Russia will not win this war and that support for Ukraine will eventually push Moscow toward serious negotiations. Moscow and much of Eurasia proceed from the opposite premise. Russia cannot be defeated militarily, and therefore continuing the war only multiplies the losses of all sides. Few direct channels remain through which these two narratives could meet. The dialogue between Kazakhstan and Germany has become one of them. Since 2023, Tokayev has discussed the war with German chancellors three times, and each of these conversations has shown where the positions diverge and where room for convergence remains.
2023: Support for the sanctions regime
Since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, high-level contacts between Astana and Berlin have gone through three stages. The first was Tokayev’s official visit to Berlin in September 2023, when Olaf Scholz was chancellor. At the time, the Ukrainian issue was addressed mainly through the lens of sanctions. Following the talks, Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would comply with the sanctions regime and that the German side should have no concerns about circumvention. Scholz, in turn, expressed hope that Kazakhstan would help ensure Germany’s energy security.
This logic defined the pragmatic foundation of the relationship. Germany gained a reliable supplier of oil and raw materials, while Kazakhstan received a political signal that its multi-vector policy was understood in Berlin. That same year, Kazakh oil began flowing to the Schwedt refinery through the Russian pipeline system.
2024: Russia cannot be defeated militarily
The second stage is linked to Scholz’s visit to Astana in September 2024. It was there that Tokayev made the statement that still shapes how his position is perceived in Europe. He told the chancellor that Russia is militarily invincible and that further escalation would lead to irreparable consequences for all of humanity. Tokayev also endorsed the Chinese-Brazilian peace plan, called the abandonment of the Istanbul agreements a missed opportunity, and proposed halting hostilities first and discussing territorial issues later.
Berlin’s reaction was restrained. Scholz disagreed with his Kazakh counterpart’s assessment and reiterated that Germany supports Kyiv. The joint press conference was cancelled, and the chancellor addressed journalists alone. A month later, at the Astana Think Tank Forum, Tokayev repeated the thesis, citing Russia’s military potential and history, and described the alternative to negotiations as a road to the abyss.
Notably, the economic agenda did not suffer from this disagreement. Germany effectively accepted a model in which political assessments of the war and business cooperation develop in parallel.
2026: A quick end to the war is unrealistic
The third stage came with the current visit. Tokayev’s counterpart was Friedrich Merz, whose position on Ukraine is tougher than his predecessor’s. At the joint press conference on Sept. 29, Merz stated that Russia will not win this war and that Germany supports Ukraine without any reduction. He also identified air defence as Ukraine’s weakest point ahead of the coming winter.
Tokayev presented his position in a new form. He acknowledged that a quick end to the war is unrealistic under current conditions and proposed freezing hostilities in order to then move on to diplomacy. At the same time, he explicitly referred to the need to preserve every country’s territorial integrity and to respect the Ukrainian people, their culture and language. A similar position was included in the joint declaration of Tokayev and Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
The second part of his answer drew a stronger response. Tokayev called Vladimir Putin an outstanding statesman and the most acceptable political figure for Central Asia, Europe and the world, and once again described Russia and Ukraine as good friends of Kazakhstan.
Comparing the two statements reveals one consistent line and one notable change. What has remained consistent is the sequence of steps Astana proposes. A ceasefire comes first, a political settlement second. Tokayev voiced this formula to Scholz in 2024 and repeated it to Merz in 2026, and in July 2026 in Omsk he proposed to Putin freezing the conflict on the basis of the Istanbul agreements. What has changed is the nature of the argument. In 2024, Tokayev spoke about the military balance and effectively offered a forecast of the war’s outcome. In 2026, he speaks about a procedure for exiting it and emphasises territorial integrity, a principle Berlin shares. The formula of Russian invincibility has disappeared from his public remarks in Berlin, although its logic persists in the thesis that a quick peace is unrealistic.
The format of the dialogue has changed as well. In 2024, the disagreement coincided with the cancellation of the planned joint press appearance, reportedly at the initiative of the Kazakh side. In 2026, the leaders held a joint briefing, each set out his position, and this did not prevent the signing of agreements. For relations between a middle power and the EU’s leading economy, this is a sign of maturity. The two sides have learned to record their differences without damaging the shared agenda.
Kazakhstan Affected by a War It Has Nothing to Do With
Tokayev’s position cannot be understood without taking geography into account. In summer 2026, the vulnerability of Kazakh exports became tangible. From 1 May, transit of Kazakh oil to Germany through Russia via the Druzhba pipeline was suspended, even though 2.1 million tonnes were shipped along this route to the Schwedt refinery in 2025 and around 3 million tonnes were planned for 2026. Overall, Kazakhstan supplied Germany with more than 10 million tonnes of oil in 2025. Most of these volumes still pass through Russian territory and ports.
This is why Astana simultaneously complies with sanctions, avoids public confrontation with Moscow and promotes the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). According to Tokayev, freight volumes on the TITR grew by 22% in the first 8 months of 2026. For Germany, the route means access to Central Asian raw materials bypassing Russia. For Kazakhstan, it means reduced dependence on a single transit partner.
The raw materials component of the visit underlines the same logic. Kazakhstan accounts for about 13% of EU oil imports and 20% of natural uranium supplies, and critical minerals became a central topic of the talks. Trade between the two countries reached 4.5 billion in 2025.
Tokayev’s Berlin formula
Moscow responded to the Berlin statements in its own way. Dmitry Peskov noted that Putin regularly briefs Tokayev on the course of military operations. This is a reminder that Astana’s mediating rhetoric has its limits. Kazakhstan is unlikely to become a negotiating venue in the near future, but it may retain its role as a channel through which European capitals hear Eurasia’s cautious position.
For Germany, Kazakhstan remains a partner that does not share its assessment of the war but fulfills its sanctions obligations and increases raw material supplies. For Kazakhstan, Germany remains its main European partner, ready to accept its multi-vector policy as a given. The invitation to Merz to visit Kazakhstan in 2027, on the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations, will be the next test of this model. If a ceasefire is in place in Ukraine by then, Tokayev’s Berlin formula will acquire a practical dimension. If not, relations between the two countries will continue to rest on oil, metals and logistics, and the conversation about the war will remain a ritual, if unavoidable, part of every meeting.
Visit results and adaptation to new realities
The practical results of the visit show that differences over the war do not slow down the economic agenda. Ahead of the talks, the parties prepared 37 bilateral projects worth EUR 1.8 billion in industry, raw materials processing, energy and logistics. The joint declaration set out a course toward joint production and processing of critical raw materials within Kazakhstan and affirmed the strategic importance of the Trans-Caspian corridor. Recalling that the country produces 21 of 34 types of critical raw materials, Tokayev offered Berlin a joint value chain from geological exploration to component manufacturing and recycling, as well as a shared investment and financial platform. Among the concrete agreements, Linde and Qarmet signed a deal to build an air separation unit in Temirtau, and the Kazakh side agreed to export to Germany railway wheels manufactured on German equipment. At the same time, the US$2 billion figure so far reflects signed documents, and the real test will be financing, construction and the launch of enterprises.
The visit shows how two states at opposite ends of Eurasia are building relations amid a protracted war. Germany and Kazakhstan continue to seek a path to settlement in Eastern Europe while differing in their assessment of its conditions, and in parallel they are reshaping their economic ties to fit the new reality. Berlin needs reliable raw material supplies that bypass Russia and resilient supply chains after the 2022 energy crisis. Astana needs technology, investment and routes that reduce dependence on a single transit neighbour, and the halt of supplies via Druzhba made this need evident. In this model, diplomacy around the war and business cooperation work as two parts of one adaptation strategy. The deeper the mutual economic interest, the more resilient the channel through which Berlin and Astana can discuss the war without putting the partnership itself at risk.
The author is Eldaniz Gusseinov, a co-founder and head of research at Nightingale Int.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Astana Times.
