The C6 has rebuilt political trust since 2018. Turning more than 200 regional initiatives into results now depends on permanent bodies with clear mandates.
Sobir Kurbanov. Photo credit: Personal archive
When the leaders of Central Asia and Azerbaijan met in Avaza, Turkmenistan, on Oct. 8, it was the first Consultative Meeting of Heads of State with Azerbaijan as a full participant. The wider format links Central Asia with the South Caucasus and, through it, with European markets.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used the summit to raise a practical question. He noted that more than 200 initiatives have been put forward since 2018, while only a small share has been implemented, and proposed that the foreign ministries take inventory of them. The proposal leads to a broader question about how the region can deliver on its commitments without permanent institutions to carry them out.
Uzbekistan’s opening in 2016 started the return of regional trust
After the Soviet collapse, the five republics inherited integrated production chains and a common infrastructure network. Over the following decades, closed borders and unresolved territorial disputes pulled them apart. The Ferghana Valley, the region’s most densely populated area, suffered most from border restrictions and periodic violent clashes.
Change began in 2016, when President Shavkat Mirziyoyev opened Uzbekistan’s economy and borders. The Consultative Meetings, launched in Astana in 2018, then became the main platform for rebuilding confidence among the region’s leaders. Russia’s war in Ukraine and growing uncertainty over northern trade routes later raised interest in southern and trans-Caspian connectivity.
Border settlements have opened the Ferghana Valley to cooperation
On March 13, 2025, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon signed a border treaty after armed clashes in 2021 and 2022. On March 31, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met in Khujand. They signed a treaty fixing the junction point of their three borders, along with the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship.
The second Ferghana Peace Forum, held in Guliston, Tajikistan, on Sept. 28-29, brought together the governors of the three border provinces. A valley once known for border conflict is becoming a space for cross-border trade and joint development.
Trade and travel data show the gains of renewed trust
In November 2025, Mirziyoyev reported that intraregional trade had doubled over eight years to about $11 billion and that mutual investment had grown 5.6 times. Uzbekistan’s trade with its neighbors tripled from $2.4 billion in 2016 to $7.2 billion in 2024, and the number of joint enterprises passed 1,800.
Travel recovered as well. In the first nine months of 2017, about 379,000 Uzbek citizens traveled to Kyrgyzstan. In the same period of 2018, the number rose to 2.42 million. In 2025, foreign visits to Uzbekistan to see relatives reached 7.86 million.
Joint investment is also growing. Under the agreed structure for the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant, Kyrgyzstan holds 34%, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hold 33% each. The three countries held the third round of talks on an intergovernmental agreement for the project in Almaty in September 2026. Much of this progress still rests on political leadership and bilateral deals.
Institutional integration lags behind political rapprochement
A company working in several Central Asian markets often needs separate registration and certification in each. Trade and transit rules remain fragmented, partly because Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic belong to the Eurasian Economic Union while their neighbors do not. The region also lacks a common framework for recognizing professional qualifications, which limits the benefits of growing labor mobility.
Water and energy management is the most pressing case. Upstream hydropower and downstream irrigation require coordinated planning, especially as climate change reduces water availability, yet cooperation still depends on bilateral negotiations. Newer areas such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity raise the same coordination problem. Azerbaijan’s participation adds trans-Caspian opportunities and makes regulatory interoperability more important.
More than 200 initiatives need a body responsible for implementation
Mirziyoyev addressed the same concern in Avaza. He called for “a flexible and transparent format in which strong, sovereign, and independent states cooperate.” He also said that implementation matters more than the number of documents, and made clear that Tashkent does not want heavy new structures.
The two positions describe a real dilemma. The region needs stronger mechanisms to deliver agreed priorities, while governments remain cautious about bodies that could constrain sovereignty. Institutionalization need not mean a supranational government. The practical question is whether the C6 states will delegate narrowly defined coordination and monitoring functions to joint bodies. Without them, responsibility stays spread across national ministries, and initiatives lose momentum once leaders return home.
Other regions show that integration can coexist with sovereignty
Under Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU acts only within the competences member states have conferred on it. Its institutions set common market rules, while national authority remains intact outside the agreed mandates.
ASEAN offers a model closer to Central Asian preferences. It rests on consensus, yet the ASEAN Secretariat’s Integration Monitoring Directorate tracks compliance with agreed economic measures in support of the ASEAN Economic Community Council. In MERCOSUR, the 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol established intergovernmental bodies, including a Trade Commission that monitors the common trade policy.
None of these models is flawless. The EU struggles with complex governance, while ASEAN and MERCOSUR have faced implementation gaps and recurring trade disputes. All of them rely on institutions that work between summits and turn political decisions into action.
A permanent architecture would complement the Consultative Meetings
The heads of state should remain the highest platform for setting priorities, while implementation passes to regional bodies with clear mandates.
A C6 Regional Coordination Secretariat could operate under the rotating chairmanship with a small permanent staff that keeps a registry of commitments and publishes annual progress reports. A permanent team would prevent the loss of institutional memory at each rotation. Specialized councils on water and energy, customs, transport and digital policy would bring national ministries and regulators together.
Over time, and subject to national approval, governments could delegate limited regulatory functions in selected areas, starting with mutual recognition of qualifications and cross-border transport procedures. Full customs harmonization would remain a long-term goal given Eurasian Economic Union commitments.
Every major C6 declaration should come with an action plan naming responsible institutions and deadlines. A public online dashboard could show businesses and citizens what regional cooperation delivers. These bodies should be judged by whether they lower transaction costs and improve the management of shared resources.
Shared institutions can strengthen the sovereignty of smaller states
Governments can keep final authority over the scope of cooperation and delegate specific functions through clear agreements with consensus decision-making and parliamentary oversight. No single country can manage transboundary rivers and transport corridors, so joint institutions would increase each member’s effective capacity. A C6 framework would also help the region engage the EU, China, Russia, the United States and Türkiye while preserving independent foreign policies.
The next summit could adopt an institutional reform agenda
Tokayev’s call to review existing initiatives could be the starting point. The review should go beyond sorting relevant commitments from outdated ones. The C6 countries could commission a joint assessment of current mechanisms and a phased roadmap toward permanent coordination bodies, which the next summit could adopt in place of a new list of declarations.
The transition will be gradual, and differences among the six economies call for flexibility. The region has built political trust over the past decade. Its next task is to build institutions that work between summits.
The author is Sobir Kurbanov, an economist at Nightingale Int., a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm focused on Central Asia and Greater Eurasia.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of The Astana Times.
